EASA and IATA roll out coordinated action plan to counter rising threat of GNSS interference

In Summary

Jamming incidents have sharply increased across Eastern Europe and the Middle East The European Union Aviation […]

Jamming incidents have sharply increased across Eastern Europe and the Middle East

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) have unveiled a comprehensive joint action plan to address the growing threat posed by global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference. Announced following a high-level workshop held in Cologne, Germany, on May 22–23, the plan is the clearest indication yet of how seriously global aviation stakeholders are taking the rise in jamming and spoofing incidents that compromise flight safety.

The workshop, hosted at EASA headquarters, brought together over 120 experts from the aviation industry, research institutions, international organisations, and government bodies. The discussions revealed a growing consensus that the nature of GNSS disruptions—once seen as isolated and manageable—is becoming more frequent, complex, and geographically widespread. Incidents have notably increased across Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and similar reports are now emerging from other regions, prompting calls for global action.

In remarks that underscored the urgency of the issue, Jesper Rasmussen, EASA’s Flight Standards Director, said GNSS disruptions are no longer a problem that can simply be contained. “We must build resilience,” he said. “The evolving nature of the threat demands a dynamic and ambitious action plan.”

He emphasized the importance of collaborative action across agencies, noting that EASA is working closely with partners in the EU and IATA, while also supporting the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure aviation remains safe, secure, and navigable.

According to IATA’s own data collected through its Global Aviation Data Management Flight Data eXchange, the number of GPS signal loss events spiked by 220 percent between 2021 and 2024. This surge has been attributed largely to geopolitical tensions and the deliberate use of jamming or spoofing technology, whether for military or other purposes.

Nick Careen, IATA’s Senior Vice President for Operations, Safety and Security, said the trend is unlikely to reverse in the near term, which makes coordinated response measures even more critical. “We are working together to reinforce the redundancies built into the system, to keep flying safe,” Careen said. He added that the next crucial step is for ICAO to move swiftly to align global standards, guidance, and reporting protocols—calling this a priority for the upcoming ICAO Assembly.

The plan agreed upon at the Cologne workshop centres on four main areas – enhancing reporting and real-time monitoring of interference events; investing in prevention and technical mitigation; ensuring navigation system redundancies and resilient infrastructure; and improving civil-military coordination and preparedness for emerging threats, including those affecting unmanned aerial systems.

One of the workshop’s key recommendations is to standardise radio reporting language for pilots experiencing GNSS interference and to harmonise NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) formats to ensure swift and accurate information dissemination. Experts also emphasized the urgent need for real-time airspace monitoring tools and quicker sharing of threat intelligence with both civil and military authorities.

On the technical front, participants called for stricter control over the sale and export of jamming devices and urged support for the development of cockpit tools such as portable spoofing detectors. Additional research is also being encouraged to refine terrain awareness systems and improve the resilience of aircraft GNSS receivers in the face of signal loss.

The group stressed the importance of retaining traditional navigation aids as a reliable fallback, particularly in airspaces that rely heavily on GNSS. There were also calls to incorporate military tactical navigation infrastructure, where feasible, into civil aviation monitoring efforts. This would give airspace managers more accurate and timely data on interference hotspots, which can then be used to design better contingency plans for flight re-routing or reversion to manual navigation.

Furthermore, the action plan calls for greater civil-military coordination, especially in sharing data on radio frequency interference events. Participants also noted the importance of preparing for future threats that could affect not only commercial aircraft but also drones and emerging aerial systems that increasingly rely on satellite navigation.

The implications of this joint initiative go beyond Europe and the Middle East. African aviation stakeholders, many of whom are aggressively modernizing their airspace using GNSS-dependent systems, are also vulnerable. As African carriers expand fleets, optimize flight routes, and adopt performance-based navigation, resilience to interference must become a core part of their planning. In countries where traditional VOR and DME systems have been phased out, a GNSS blackout could pose immediate risks to safety and operations.

EASA and IATA’s action plan is a timely reminder that while GNSS technology has revolutionized global aviation, it is not immune to disruption—natural or man-made. The workshop’s findings now put the onus on ICAO to turn recommendations into binding global standards. Until then, the aviation world must brace itself for a more contested navigational environment and invest collectively in keeping the skies safe, even when invisible signals are compromised.

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